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INTRODUCTION
The packaging industry is very diverse and
makes use of a large variety of materials for
packaging and substances/materials/items to be
packaged. The industry stores materials, mixtures,
and products in small and in large quantities and
units. There is also a range of processes involved as
shaping, filling, painting, and finishing. Altogether,
the industry handles, stores, and processes a host of
combustible materials; there are numerous ignition
sources around and even, albeit in smaller quantities, toxic materials. There is therefore a chance of
mishap with disastrous consequences given a situation of sizable quantity of material/substance with
hazardous properties.
Scale enlargement of operations leads to large
quantities. Space is scarce, competition severe, time
is costly, and hence safety is under pressure. Several
accidents around the world with disastrous results
show that such an event means a risk for the continuity of the company or puts the company at least
under a severe financial threat. On the other hand,
experience shows too that a good safety attitude
instigated from the top pursuing thorough hazard
identification, and investing in risk controls by preventive and protective measures, hence performing
risk assessment, increases productivity and worker

motivation, and lowers the frequencies and costs of
mishaps. Workers are feeling more secure, safety
culture is fostered, and insurance charges are being
lowered.

EXAMPLES OF MISHAPS
Two examples of disastrous mishaps will be
briefly considered. The first is of a company in
the Netherlands burned down and going bankrupt,
namely Chemie-Pack at Moerdijk in 2011. About
the event an extensive report by the Dutch Accident
Investigation Board (OVV) has been published [1]
Fig. 1. Fire at Chemie-Pack, Moerdijk, the Netherlands, January 2009 (Foto:Micha Okkerman/
Twitter).
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The company with a workforce of 50 had activities of repacking chemicals going on at the present
location since 1982. On the rectangular premises
were several sheds, storage buildings, and an office
along the fence periphery, all connected with the
entrance via a courtyard. The facility was licensed
according to the Seveso Directive. At the day of the
fire with an outside temperature of, at maximum, 3
to 4 oC, several orders were being worked on. Due
to the high activity, level stores were overfilled and
although violating their license, the courtyard contained a variety of stored flammables such as xylene
and other raw materials for plastics, packed in a few
hundred 1m3 IBC’s (intermediate bulk containers)
and 200 litre steel drums. One activity was pumping
resin components and mixing them. The mixing
was under a roof, but the pump was outside and was
cleaned before the operation with xylene of which
some was spilled. As due to the low temperature the
pump ceased working, it was heated with a handheld
propane burner. The xylene underneath accidentally ignited; a powder fire extinguisher brought in
appeared not to function. Meanwhile the resin pump
kept on running while the heated exit line broke and
resin spilled. The crew then tried to extinguish the
fire with a water jet worsening the situation drastically. One of the IBCs caught fire (see [2] for behaviour of an IBC in fire) upon which the event escalated quickly. The local fire brigade rushed in but
was overwhelmed by the conflagration and called
in regional forces. An enormous, many kilometres
long black cloud started passing over large cities
causing much anxiety in the population. Preparedness for such an event appeared to be low, leadership
and coordination failed, and crisis teams on local
and regional policy levels were informed too late.
The firewater polluted agricultural grounds causing
tens of millions of damage. Inspection of the plant
had occurred over the years after pre-announcement. This way, work not allowed by the license,
was not noted. Personnel were badly trained. Over

the years management obtained advice on fire safety
measures, but follow-up was inadequate. The whole
is a typical example of a lack of safety manage-ment
and bad safety culture. The event aroused much parliamentary and government response.
The second example is an American one
reported by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board [3]. This concerns a vapour cloud
explosion inside a small facility caused by an overnight release from a solvent tank for preparing ink
for ink products. The explosion in the middle of night
caused 10 people injured, 24 houses, and 6 businesses destroyed, Fig. 2. The facility was operated
Fig. 2. Left. Disastrous result of vapour cloud
explosion inside an ink products plant near Boston,
USA [3]. Right. Mixing tank with flammable solvent
steam heated to 32 oC [3].
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by two companies, CAI Inc. (20 employees) and
Arnel Inc. (9 employees) which before 1985 formed
one entity. The plant stored thousands of litres of
solvents and 25 tons of industrial nitrocellulose
pellets (most of which in a trailer adjacent to the
building). The 7500 litres solvent tank filled with
volatile flammable liquid was steam heated to 32 oC
to dissolve resin. At the end of a normal workday in
November 2006, the production manager left leaving
the stirrer on and believed to have closed the steam
supply. Half an hour later the last employee switched
off ventilation fans (exhaust and fresh air supply)
and locked the building. At 2:46 in the morning
alarm went off at the local fire brigade 1.5 km away;
few seconds later the firemen experienced the blast.
Several organizations contributed to the emergency
response. The fire brigade was not made aware of
the hazardous materials present. A complication
arose when pipework of a LPG tank of a neighbouring bakery started leaking (domino effect). In the
middle of the night, 300 people had to be evacuated,
and the fire burned for 17 hours. Management had
not conducted a process hazard analysis; volatile
flammables were stored inside the building with no
detectors and alarm provisions or adequate ventilation. Written procedures or checklists did not exist.
Again, this is an example of a lack of safety management, training, emergency response, and a poor
safety culture.

HAZARDS, DANGER, SAFETY,
SECURITY AND RISKS
English is a language that makes a distinction
between hazard and danger and between safety and
security. Many other languages do not. Hazard is
an inherent capability (energy, material/substance
property, activity) for harm or damage by an effect
to something exposed that is valued; danger is a hazardous situation prone to result in harm or damage.
Safety is a state of being protected against harm and

other consequences of failure, while security is concerned with being protected, for instance, against terrorist or other criminal acts. Safety can be inherent
in the absence of hazards; it can be engineered by
applying measures, and it can be procedural by
developing and implementing rules. Much the same
can be said of security. In Figure 3 the elements are
illustrated: a trigger unleashes the hazard potential
in case the preventive barrier ceases due to a chain
of causes.
Fig. 3. Illustration of elements of a hazard
scenario for an exposed receptor; LOP is layer of
protection [4].

A distinction should be made between process
safety and personal safety, although the two are
linked. Personal safety concerns the slips, trips, falls,
and the like. By Occupational Safety and Health
regulation, the EU Machine Directive, training and
personal protection equipment (PPE) over the years
much improvement has been seen. Process safety is
concerned with high impact, low probability events.
It is more treacherous as it usually seems to occur
without warning and for those involved unknown.
For many years a process can run without a problem
and yet suddenly disaster strikes. Process safety
deserves enhanced attention.
Risk is defined in ISO 31000, Risk management
principles and guidelines, as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. In other words, absolute safety
as objective means absence of risks, but as there are
always risks around, safety is never perfect. Safety
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cannot be quantified, but risk can. Risk components
are possible consequence/effect severity and likelihood/probability, which both can be quantified but
remain subject to uncertainty, consequence less than
likelihood. Uncertainty will reduce when our knowledge level increases.

RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
General
Risk analysis consists of a systematic search for
what can go wrong, what likelihood this will have,
and how severe consequences will be. In assessment
one asks whether the established risks are acceptable, or at least tolerable, and if not what can be done
to reduce them to a tolerable level. Hence, it is trying
to answer the question “how safe is safe enough?” in
a predictive sense.
A risk assessment, whether it is on safety, on
success of a project or of an investment must always
start with establishing context, of goal, stakeholders,
and key elements. Then, follows identification of the
risks via scenarios as shown in Figure 3: hazards,
triggers, possible effects, exposed target vulnerability. Next is determination of consequences followed
by that of likelihoods. The latter are the most difficult to determine. In fact, probability and thus
uncertainty comes in at all key elements, as neither
consequences nor the chance of occurrence can be
determined accurately due to many possible influencing conditions, and lack of insight and knowledge. Nevertheless it pays to make estimates, determine a relative order by risk magnitude and distribute available resources for preventive and protective
risk reducing measures such that an optimum risk
level will be obtained.
Qualitative methods
A first approach to obtain an overview of risks
threatening your operations would be to derive a

qualitative risk matrix as shown in Figure 4. It is a
matter of making a hazard inventory of quantities
of hazardous substances present, estimate effects
in case an unintentional release will take place by
a sudden rupture of a container, a large leak occurring during a limited time, say 10 minutes, or a small
leak over an indefinitely long time. Given a leak the
property of the spilled material is important: volatility, flammability, toxicity, oxidizing property, or
corrosiveness. Further, risks shall be considered due
to unintentional release of a large amount of potential energy such as large mass falling, bursting of
container with compressed gas, et cetera.
Fig. 4. Qualitative risk matrix with example risk
dots and indicated urgency of risk reduction action

Although for identification a host of methods
is available, two are really important: Hazard and
Operability study (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA). Both HAZOP and FMEA
should be carried out by a team led by an experienced chairman. In HAZOP a team performs a systematic analysis of the effect of deviations from
design intent (+, - or not); HAZOPs are conducted
worldwide. FMEA partly overlaps HAZOP but contributes. Because of the required effort, research
is going on to increase productivity by a system
approach and use of computing power. Human,
management, and organizational failure are the most
difficult causes to predict.
Semi-quantitative and quantitative risk
assessments (QRA)
In a semi-quantitative approach severity of an
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event and probability of its occurrence are estimated in orders of magnitude and may be plotted in
a risk matrix as in Figure 4 but then with logarithmic scales and units of factors of 10. Consequence
severity may be expressed in monetary units. For
predicting severity one has to apply physical models
of heating, collapse, rupture, fracturing, outflow,
evaporation, dispersion, ignition, explosion, fire, and
toxic concentration. Probability is considered over a
certain period usually a year and is called frequency.
In a risk matrix frequency ranges usually from an
event once in ten to once in ten million years (10 -1
to 10 -7/yr).
Fully quantitative methods must generate
detailed scenarios with cascading and escalating
effects. It will include so-called domino effects of
one unit to another, and incompatibility between
stored substances in case of fire. Such analyses are
effort intensive and always lack data. The main
value, however, is the brainstorming in a team and
the thinking about cost effective risk reduction.
Limitations
Uncertainty and unknowns limit the confidence
one can have in risk assessments. One or two factors
of ten uncertainty range is not unusual. Accidents
not having been predicted by an assessment are
plenty. Yet, a systematic approach is key to attain
control on risks.

PREVENTIVE
MEASURES

AND

PROTECTIVE

Leadership, management, organizational
measures
As in many things in life but certainly in safety
the attitude of leadership in a company is crucial.
There may be many safety paraphernalia such as
signs “Safety first”, but when a CEO does not care
or is perceived not to care about safety, accidents are

bound to happen. Analysis of many accidents has
over and over again shown that behind the direct and
intermediate causes there are root causes that for a
very high proportion are management failures.
Very helpful and accepted in many companies
is a safety management system (SMS). EU Seveso
Directive 3 requires it for ‘establishments’ that fall
within its scope of controlling major hazards, but
it may be as well useful for companies exhibiting
smaller risks. An SMS has many similarities with
a quality management system and implementing
it can also mean higher quality and effectiveness,
hence higher productivity. A SMS contains requirements with respect to roles and responsibilities of
employees, identification and evaluation of hazards,
training/retraining, operational control and procedures, management of change, emergency planning,
performance monitoring with indicators, auditing
and reviewing, and corrective organizational mechanisms.
Today, also the safety culture and measuring it
via safety climate surveys is given much weight.
Bowtie thinking
The bowtie developed from the late 1970s
onwards but the concept really spread in 2000 and
later. The name derives from the gentleman’s tie as
two triangles pointing to each other. Left triangle is
a fault tree showing cause-consequence chains with
OR and AND gates and the right triangle an event
tree of possible events developing and branching out
after a critical or initiating event following occurring
failure causes, see Figure 5. The bowtie appeared to
be an excellent concept to obtain an overview where
preventing (left) and protecting (right) barriers are
useful or already present. Each branch from left to
the far right forms a scenario.
Although the bowtie originally was thought of
being composed of two technical quantitative risk
analysis tools: a fault tree with its top event being the
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Fig. 5. Generic bowtie as it was applied in the EU ARAMIS risk assessment improvement project in the early
2000 era led by INERIS in France [5].
LEGEND
UE = Undesired Event, e.g., human act
CU E = Current Event condition, direct cause
IE = Intermediate Event, e.g., pump fails
CE = Critical Release Event, 12 types: leak, start of fire, etc.
SCE = Secondary CE, escalation
DP = Dangerous Phenomena, 13 types: Vapour, cloud
explosion, pool fire, jet fire, etc.
ME = Major Event, 4 types: overpressure, heat radiation,
toxic load, and missiles.
Barriers left of CE are Preventative (or Pro-active), and right
Protective or Mitigative (also called Reactive).

initiating event of an event tree, it can well be used
qualitatively to discuss risks and prevention and protection measures. In that case, the hazard is often
symbolized by a rectangular box above the critical
event (CE) with an arrow down to it to show how
activating the CE unleashes the hazard potential, as
shown in Figure 3.
Properties of materials, physical measures:
explosion and fire protection
Material data sheets contain many properties.
Test methods are available. Measures are possible to
reduce risk of explosion and fire, the most common
threats in the packaging industry, although fire
causes toxics. Sources of knowledge are plentiful. Practical sources that can be consulted for free
are FM Global Data sheets: https://www.fmglobal.
com/fmglobalregistration/. Lower flammable limits
of most hydrocarbons are around 2 vol. % in air.
Ignition can occur by a myriad of source types. An
important principle is compartmentalization to avert

explosion and block fire progress.
Regulatory: protection of workers, population, environment
Company operators as they are called in EU
Directives have a responsibility for occupational
safety and health of workers and for the safety of residents with regard to major hazards resulting from
operations on their premises. Two of these regulations concerned with preventing and protecting for
gas and dust explosion effects shall be mentioned
here as important for the branch: ATEX 95 and 137
directives (Atmosphères Explosibles). The first is
with respect to equipment not forming an ignition
source in various degrees of protection depending on its location as prescribed by ATEX 137. The
latter is requiring a risk assessment, e.g., resulting
in an area classification in three hazard zones 0, 1,
and 2 for gases and 20, 21, and 22 for combustible
dusts, meaning for 0 and 20 permanently, for longer
duration or frequently explosive (US: flammable)

Journal of Applied Packaging Research

13

atmosphere present, for 1 and 21 likely to be present
occasionally and for 2 and 22 not likely and of short
duration. With these safety regulations Europe is in
the preventative forefront witnessing disasters elsewhere.
Another European achievement pertains to the
risk acceptance criteria. The most known one that
captures most of the following elsewhere is the UK
HSE’s ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable. It has a certain development history. First is the
distinction of three risk levels: Unacceptable, Tolerable and Acceptable. As a minimum, risk must be
lowered to become tolerable, but then further reduction must be realized till costs become unreasonably
higher than the benefits. This required more detailed
ruling, which took time to develop.
Emergency planning
Various parties are involved: company responders, community fire brigade, medical personnel,
and police (for investigation of cause and providing
quick access to the site). A risk assessment is a good
basis for planning but is not enough. From the many
scenarios a selection must be made and in a team a
scenario analysis conducted to think through details
and familiarize all parties with the situation. Periodically training, alarming, testing of equipment and
teamwork is a must, in particular to train company
and community emergency responders in effective
cooperation together.

properties of substances together with imagination
and data for scenario building.
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CONCLUSIONS
Risk assessment and management pays. Their
methods may have many weaknesses, but they
compel us to think about and characterize hazards
and analyse risks. By reducing likelihood and
effects, and therefore costs of mishaps, they can
prevent much misery. Methodical improvements are
underway as discussed and exemplified in [4]. Their
application assumes good knowledge of hazardous
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